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Abstract
We argue that financial market development contributed to the rise in the skill
premium and residual wage inequality in the US since the 1980s. We present an
endogenous growth model with imperfect credit markets and establish how im-
proving the efficiency of these markets affects modes of production, innovation
and wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers. The experience of US
states following banking deregulation provides empirical support for our hypothe-
sis. We find that wages of college educated workers increased by between 0.5 - 1.2
% following deregulation while those of workers with a high school diploma fell by
about 2.2 %. Similarly, residual (or within-group) inequality increased. The 90-50
percentile ratio of residuals from a Mincerian wage regression and their standard
deviation increased by 4.5% and 1.8%, respectively.
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21 Introduction
In recent years the increase in wage inequality in the US has received a lot of attention from
economists. Researchers have documented the rise since the 1980s in overall wage inequal-
ity, differentials between wages of college degree and high school diploma holders (between
group inequality), as well as the increase in wage differentials measured within education and
experience groups (residual or within group inequality).1 The factors usually identified with
the increase in wage inequality are trade, changes in labor market institutions, technological
progress, and organizational change. In this paper we study the role of financial develop-
ment as an independent source of the increase in wage inequality. We consider financial
development as a combination of changes in regulatory policy and financial innovation that
provided easier access to finance for firms (particularly start-ups). We develop a model that
links financial development to wage outcomes and we test the predictions of the model using
state-level data from the US during the recent period of financial deregulation.
The interaction between entrepreneurial finance, organizational change, and technological
progress has become an increasingly important component of the innovation and technology
adoption process in the US in recent decades. Following the 1979 amendment to the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which permitted pension funds to invest
in risky asset vehicles such as venture capital, the amount of capital flowing into venture
capital firms increased substantially (Gompers & Lerner, 2004, Chapter 1). Subsequently,
venture capital financing was found to have a positive impact on innovation (Kortum &
Lerner, 2000). Dynan et al. (2006) document the greater ease with which firms and house-
holds can access credit markets in the US during this period thanks to financial innovation
and changes in government policy. Black and Strahan (2002) show that entrepreneurial ac-
tivity (measured by the rate of new business incorporations) increased following banking
deregulation across the US in the 1980s.
Associated with these developments was a change in organizational form in the US econ-
omy. Smaller firms employing workers of relatively similar skill levels rose in prominence,
whereas the large scale corporations that mixed workers of differing skills declined. Kremer
& Maskin (1996) document that the correlation between wages of US manufacturing workers
in the same plant rose from 0.76 in 1975 to 0.80 in 1986 and argue that this “segregation by
skill” contributed to the rise in wage inequality. The coincident timing of these developments
suggests that financial development may have facilitated the change in organizational form
(and thus the widening of the wage distribution) by promoting the emergence of smaller,
innovative start-up firms.
We build on these insights and construct a model which demonstrates that financial de-
velopment leads to organizational change (in the sense of a reallocation of workers by skill
levels across firms), which leads to the widening of the wage distribution. Specifically, finan-
1Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008.
3cial development drives up the skilled/unskilled wage differential (between group inequality)
and can also increase within group inequality.
The second part of the paper confronts these predictions with evidence from the US.
The results of our individual-level specifications as well as state-level panels confirm the
theoretical predictions of the model. We find that the states which deregulated their banking
sector earlier also experienced larger increases in the skill premium.2 Furthermore, we find
that deregulation of the banking sector is associated with an increase in overall as well as
upper tail residual wage inequality.
The estimated effects of deregulation are also economically meaningful. We find that
wages of college educated workers increased by between 0.5 - 1.2 % following deregulation,
while those of workers with a high school diploma fell by about 2.2 %. Similarly, residual (or
within-group) inequality increased. The 90-50 percentile ratio of residuals from a Mincerian
wage regression and their standard deviation increased by 4.5% and 1.8%, respectively,
following deregulation.
These results strongly suggest that financial development, so far not acknowledged as
a contributing factor, may in fact have been quite important for the changes in the wage
distribution over the last several decades. As Dynan et al. (2006) have documented, there
have been other important developments in US financial markets besides state deregulation
of banking. To the extent that the changes have affected wage outcomes in a similar way to
banking deregulation, the overall role played by financial development in shaping the wage
distribution is possibly even larger than what we find.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature and dis-
cusses the developments in the US economy over the last few decades that have motivated
our analysis. The model is presented in Section 3. We describe the data used in our analysis
in Section 4. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Explanations for rising wage inequality in the US
There exists an extensive literature documenting and attempting to explain the rise in wage
inequality over the last 25 years in the US, the UK and several other countries. The sources
identified with the increase in wage inequality in the US are trade, changes in labor mar-
ket institutions such as the minimum wage and unionization, technological progress, and
organizational change. A number of studies have questioned the importance of trade as an
explanation for the rise in inequality in the US since the relative price of skill-intensive goods
has not increased to the extent that would explain the rise in inequality (Acemoglu, 2002).
Studies have also documented that the bulk of the increase in inequality has been in the
2 Beck, Levine and Levkov (2007) show that even though deregulation increased the gap between skilled and unskilled wages,
it reduced overall income inequality (calculated based on the distribution of annual income) through its effects on hours worked
and labor force participation rates at different percentiles of the wage rate distribution, as well as across genders. In this paper,
we focus specifically on the wage rate since we are interested in studying how changes in financial markets altered the returns
to different components of human capital in the labor market (i.e. the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor).
4upper tail of the wage distribution, which would not be directly affected by changes in the
minimum wage or by de-unionization (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008).
Our research complements previous studies on the impact of technological progress and
organizational change on wage inequality, and attempts to add to this body of work by
focusing more explicitly on the role of financial markets. Papers that study the role of tech-
nology in causing the increased dispersion in wages often rely on the idea of skill-biased
technological change - SBTC (Acemoglu, 1998; Krusell et al. 2000). The idea is that tech-
nological progress over the recent decades has disproportionately improved the productivity
of skilled workers. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) argue that the introduction of com-
puters, a general purpose technology, has raised the transferability of skills across different
sectors of the economy. Better educated workers, who can adapt more easily, therefore com-
mand a higher premium since the demand for their labor has increased across the economy.
There indeed appears to be substantial empirical evidence of skill-bias in the computing and
telecommunications technologies that have been implemented in advanced industrial coun-
tries in recent times (Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998;
Machin and Van Reenen, 1998).
An explanation for the impact of technology on inequality that addresses both between
and within group inequality is that of ability biased technical change (Galor and Moav,
2000). In their paper, Galor and Moav consider that workers differ not just by skill (defined
as educational attainment), but also by innate cognitive ability. If high skilled workers have
higher ability on average and if rapid technological progress raises the return to ability, then
the relative wage of skilled workers (between group inequality) increases with the acceleration
of technological change.3 Since in their model labor is non-homogenous within skill groups,
they go beyond providing an explanation for the rise of between group inequality. At times
when the rate of technological progress accelerates, higher ability workers can adapt more
rapidly to the transition and their wages increase relative to lower ability workers within the
same educational attainment category (leading to higher within group inequality).
These explanations do not address the role of financial markets. One exception is Galor
and Moav (2000), who examine the effect of improvements in financial markets on inequality
in their model. However, their focus is on how reductions in capital market imperfections in-
crease human capital investment and the relative supply of skilled workers by making costly
education more widely accessible.4 Our model incorporates imperfect capital markets and
studies how improvements in their functioning (brought on, for example, by financial dereg-
ulation, new financial products that allow for great diversification of risk, improvements in
3Galor and Tsiddon (1997) study the relationship between technological progress, intergenerational mobility, and cyclical
movements in inequality. They argue that major technological inventions raise the return to ability, promote intergenerational
mobility, and increase earnings inequality between high skill and low skill workers. In periods of less major innovation (i.e.
when the inventions are made more “user-friendly” and accessible across the ability distribution), differences in innate ability
are less important for differences in earnings, inequality declines but also becomes more persistent across generations.
4 An earlier contribution that emphasized the connections between capital market imperfections, human capital investment,
and inequality is Galor and Zeira (1993).
5monitoring technologies) affect organizational change, growth and inequality. The increased
flow of entrepreneurial finance following financial development facilitates the emergence of
entrepreneurial start-ups - small companies focused on innovation (either in terms of devel-
oping new technologies, or in terms of adapting technologies developed elsewhere, or in terms
of providing business practice solutions such as accounting or legal advice to manufacturing
firms). In turn, the innovations delivered by the start-ups lead to a shift in production
methods as high skilled workers cluster together and separate from low skilled workers. As
high skilled workers get reallocated across firms, the skill premium increases.
Previous researchers have also studied organizational change as a factor driving inequality
(Kremer and Maskin, 1996; Acemoglu, 1999). These papers emphasize that the quality of
jobs created by firms (i.e. their hiring decisions) are driven by the supply of skills in the
labor market. As the mean skill level rises, firms that previously hired both high and low
skill workers now start focusing only on one or other type in their hiring decisions, and
the composition of jobs changes. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop a theory of
hierarchical organizations with sorting of workers by skill and use to it explain the evolution
of wage inequality in the US in the 1980s. They argue that the common underlying force
driving the decline in firm size and the rise in inequality in the US is a reduction in the
“costs of acquiring and communicating information” (p. 1412) that have come about due
to the widespread adoption of e-mail, cellphones, and wireless networks. While these papers
explain how the changing composition of jobs and sorting of workers across firms can lead
to higher inequality, they do not address a potentially important contributor to organiza-
tional change - financial development. Our model makes explicit the connections between
financial development, changes in organization of production, and the widening of the wage
distribution in the US in the last 30 years.
3 Model
We present an endogenous growth model with imperfect capital markets and establish how
financial development, which increases the availability of funding for new innovative firms,
(in a sense to be made more precise below) affects growth, organizational change and the
dispersion in wages between skilled and unskilled workers. Less skilled workers are employed
in manufacturing the final good. Skilled workers, on the other hand, either work in manu-
facturing or in an innovation / entrepreneurial sector.5 Firms in the manufacturing sector
produce final output using one of two production methods - one which combines skilled
and unskilled workers (we refer to this as the “old economy”) and the other which com-
bines skilled workers with an expanding variety of intermediate goods (we call this the “new
economy”). The intermediate goods are developed and produced by firms in the innovation
5Throughout the paper, when we discuss less skilled workers we have in mind people with education attainment at the level
of high school diploma holders and those who have not completed high school.
6sector.
We interpret organizational change as a shift in the composition of employment across
firms away from those with a more balanced mix of skilled and unskilled workers and towards
those with either a more high skill-intensive or a more low skill-intensive workforce. In the
context of our model this bifurcation will arise as skilled workers reallocate away from the
old economy firms towards the new economy firms. This will increase the share of skilled
employment in these high skill-intensive firms.
Although the model emphasizes new varieties of “intermediate goods”, the outcomes
of the innovative activities cover, more generally, adapting new technologies and business
ideas to the local environment, supply-chain support, legal and strategy consulting, and
business practice innovations in accounting and processing of payments - all of which boost
productivity in the new economy manufacturing firms. Technological progress takes place
through the expansion in the number of intermediate goods, in the style of Romer (1990).
When the variety of intermediate goods increases, the relative productivity of skilled workers
in the new economy rises and they get reallocated away from firms in the old economy. As
the number of skilled workers in the old economy firms decreases, the relative productivity of
unskilled workers falls and the skill premium in wages increases. The key point is unskilled
workers’ productivity increases in the number of skilled workers employed in the old economy.
As the skilled workers leave this sector, the unskilled wage falls.6
Our model also generates wage inequality within the group of skilled workers. We assume
that skilled workers have innovative ideas for new intermediate goods. However they lack
the funds to develop their ideas. Without outside financing, skilled workers cannot commer-
cialize their projects. Due to credit market imperfections, not every skilled worker will be
able to raise the necessary finance. Entry into the innovation sector is therefore restricted
by the rationing of finance. This drives a wedge between the wages of skilled workers in
manufacturing and the wages of skilled workers in the innovation sector.
The imperfections in credit markets arise because of asymmetric information between
creditors / financiers and skilled workers with innovative ideas. Households, in particular,
cannot monitor the activities of skilled workers in the innovation sector perfectly. Specialized
financial intermediaries therefore borrow from households and finance innovation projects.
Due to heterogeneity of projects as well as variation in the prior expertise of financial inter-
mediaries, not every intermediary is appropriate for every project. The appropriate financial
intermediary can mitigate the problems of asymmetric information and imperfect monitoring
due to prior experience or expertise with projects of a similar nature. Financial interme-
diaries therefore engage in costly search as they look for an appropriate project to finance.
We model this process using a reduced form matching function approach borrowed from the
6 Kremer and Maskin (1996) argue that organizational change has contributed to widening inequality as higher skilled
workers match with other high skilled workers in smaller, specialized firms. Previously, the prevalence (and dominance) of
large-scale companies ensured that high skilled workers mixed with low skilled workers. Low skill workers benefitted in these
large corporations, since their productivity (and wages) were boosted by working along side high skill workers.
7labor literature.7
Within this set-up, financial development (i.e. a reduction in credit market imperfections)
is associated with the availability of better screening and monitoring technology, improve-
ments in risk diversification among financial intermediaries, and greater flow of funds to
entrepreneurial firms. In the model, all of these changes translate into more a efficient
matching process and ultimately a larger number of successful matches between financiers
and skilled workers. We show below that financial development will affect the allocation of
skilled workers across sectors, increase the skilled/unskilled wage differential (between group
inequality), and can also widen the gap in wages between skilled manufacturing workers and
skilled workers in the innovation sector (within group inequality).
3.1 The basic set-up
There is one final good produced by competitive firms with access to two types of production
technologies - one which combines unskilled labor and skilled labor (the old economy) and
the other which combines skilled labor with an expanding variety of intermediate goods (the
new economy). This final good is used for consumption, entrepreneurial investment, and
for manufacturing intermediate goods. Time is continuous and the economy is populated
by infinitely lived agents of two types - skilled and unskilled. Unskilled workers can only
be employed in manufacturing the final good, whereas skilled workers can also work in
the innovation sector. There are constant measures of both types of workers, L and H
respectively.
Households
Households maximize present discounted value of linear utility with a discount rate ρ.
This pins down the interest rate.
3.2 Production, Innovation and Growth
Final Goods Producers
The final good is manufactured by perfectly competitive firms with access to two types of
production technologies. In the new economy technology, firms employ skilled labor together
with an expanding variety of intermediate goods xj, j ∈ [0, A] according to
YNt = H
1−α
Nt
∫ At
0
xαjt dj, 0 < α < 1.
In the old economy technology, firms combine skilled and unskilled labor according to a CES
production technology
YOt = Bt [H
ρ
Ot + L
ρ]
1
ρ , ρ < 1,
7 Wasmer and Weil (2005) and Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2007) follow a similar approach.
8where Bt is a technology parameter which captures spillovers from innovation in the new
economy sector. We assume Bt ≤ At for all t.
Skilled labor is mobile between the old economy firms and the new economy firms. Skilled
workers are allocated across sectors so that, in equilibrium, skilled wages are equalized across
old and new economy firms.
Let pj,t represent the price of intermediate good j, wLt denote the wage of unskilled
workers and wHt be the wage of skilled workers. Profit-maximization in the competitive
final goods sector and wage equalization for skilled workers in manufacturing lead to the
following conditions in factor markets:
pjt = αH
1−α
Nt x
α−1
jt , (1)
wLt = Bt [H
ρ
Ot + L
ρ]
1−ρ
ρ Lρ−1, (2)
wHt = (1− α)H−αNt
∫ At
0
xαjt dj (skilled wage in the new economy firms), (3)
= Bt [H
ρ
Ot + L
ρ]
1−ρ
ρ Hρ−1Ot (skilled wage in the old economy firms). (4)
Intermediate Goods Producers
This component of the framework builds on the expanding variety endogenous growth
model of Romer (1990). Each unit of intermediate goods costs one unit of final output to
produce. Intermediate goods producers hold perpetual monopoly rights. At each point in
time, they maximize the flow profit
pijt = (pjt − 1)xjt = αH1−αNt xαjt − xjt.
The optimal choice of xjt is
xjt = α
2
1−α
HNt. (5)
In equilibrium, the amount of intermediate good produced is identical across all sectors. It
follows that all intermediate goods are priced at the same mark-up over marginal cost
pjt =
1
α
,
and the flow profits
pijt =
(1− α)
α
α
2
1−α
HNt, (6)
are also identical across all intermediate sectors in equilibrium.
Innovation and Growth
Skilled workers have ideas for new varieties of intermediate goods but they need to obtain
finance to experiment and commercialize their projects. As described previously, the moral
9hazard problem that arises due to imperfect observability of innovation effort implies that
this is not a frictionless process. The specialized financial intermediaries, venture capital
firms, therefore incur costs in searching for the appropriate skilled worker to match with. If
a successful match is formed, the skilled worker begins working on the project and, with flow
probability η, produces a measure δ A of ideas for new intermediate goods. The parameter
δ measures the productivity of skilled workers in the innovation sector and A captures the
“giants’ shoulders” spillover from past research.
Let Nt be the number of skilled workers with finance (and therefore also the number of
firms in the innovation sector). The aggregate growth in the number of varieties is given by
A˙t = ηδ AtNt = ηδ At(H −HOt −HNt), (7)
where the second equality follows from the market clearing condition for skilled workers:
H = Nt +HOt +HNt.
As the number of intermediates At expands, the productivity parameter for the old econ-
omy evolves according to
·
Bt
Bt
= λ
(
At
Bt
) 1
γ
, 0 < γ < 1. (8)
The growth rate of Bt is a function of the gap between the two productivity indexes, At
and Bt. As the gap gets larger, the bigger is the spillover effect and the growth rate of Bt
increases exponentially. In the limit, with a very large gap, the spillover effect is infinite.8
Figure (1) plots the growth rates of the two productivity parameters against their ratio. The
growth rate of At is independent of the ratio
At
Bt
, whereas the growth rate of Bt increases
exponentially with this ratio. Along the Balanced Growth Path (BGP), with a constant
number of research firms N , we will have
·
Bt
Bt
=
A˙t
At
= ηδ N,
and the steady state ratio At
Bt
follows as
At
Bt
=
(
ηδ N
λ
)γ
= Z (a constant). (9)
We assume that the economy is always in the range of N where λ < ηδ N to ensure that
Z > 1.9
8 The formulation of the spillover effect is similar to the treatment of imitation costs in Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1997)
leader-follower model of cross-country technology diffusion. Also see Weil (2005, Chapter 8) for more discussion.
9This amounts to assuming λ is small relative to ηδ.
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Figure 1: Determination of the steady state growth of productivity levels A and B and the productivity gap
Z ≡ A/B.
3.3 The Capital Market
Ideas and Financing: the Matching Process
We assume that skilled workers can work in their current jobs in manufacturing while
waiting to be matched with an appropriate financial intermediary. The number of new
entrepreneurial firms that are formed in each instant as a result of the search and matching
process is given by the following matching function
Mt = ζ F
φ
t (H −Nt) 1−φ, (10)
where Ft is the number of financial intermediaries seeking skilled workers, H−Nt is the total
number of skilled workers seeking financing (i.e. all skilled workers in manufacturing), and
ζ ≥ 0 indexes the efficiency of the matching process. Note that with ζ = 0, no matches are
possible and no new entrepreneurial firms are formed. All skilled workers are employed in
manufacturing and productivity growth stalls.
The matching function (10) summarizes in a reduced form all of the frictions involved in
forming a successful match.10 Since matching involves costly search, a successful match earns
economic rents which are divided between the skilled worker and the financier in a manner
10See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a discussion on the microfoundations of matching functions, especially their
usefulness in models of trades done under asymmetric information such as the situation we study here.
11
to be described below. In this set-up, we represent financial development as an increase in
ζ, whereby a larger number of successful matches is formed for a given number of searching
financial intermediaries and unmatched skilled workers. We study the implications of an
increase in ζ for the allocation of skilled workers across sectors as well as wage outcomes for
skilled and unskilled workers in the comparative statics below.11
Define θ = (H −Nt)/Ft, i.e. the ratio of unmatched skilled workers to financial interme-
diaries. Then the probability of a financial intermediary being matched to a skilled worker
is given by
Mt
Ft
= ζ
(
H −Nt
Ft
)1−φ
= ζ θ1−φ ≡ f(θ), (11)
and the probability of a skilled worker getting matched to a financial intermediary is
Mt
H −Nt =
f(θ)
θ
, (12)
where f ′ > 0.
The number of entrepreneurial firms evolves according to
N˙t =Mt − ηNt, (13)
where ηN is the measure of entrepreneurial firms that innovate and thus cease working on a
project.
3.4 The Labor Market
Our focus is on labor market outcomes. In particular, we are interested in how the skill
premium responds to changes in financial markets.
Skilled Wages
Substituting for xjt from (5) into (3) we get
w
Ht
= (1− α)α
2α
1−α
At. (14)
In equilibrium, the wage of skilled labor is equalized across the old and new economy sectors
and is proportional to the productivity level in the new manufacturing sector.
Wage Result 1: The productivity-adjusted wage of skilled workers in manufacturing ( w˜H =
wH
A
) is independent of N , the number of innovating firms.
11 Although for the purposes of our model we emphasize financial development, a change in ζ might equally be thought of
as representing a change in labor market regulations or rules to incorporate a new entrepreneurial firm, both of which would
affect the number of successful employer-worker matches for skilled workers. Ultimately, the question of whether changes in
ζ represent financial development, alterations to labor laws, or reforms to business entry rules, is an empirical one, which we
address in the data analysis below.
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Combining the expressions from (4) and (14), in equilibrium:
(1− α)α
2α
1−α
At = Bt
[
Hρ
Ot
+ Lρ
] 1−ρ
ρ Hρ−1
Ot
. (15)
As At grows, skilled labor is drawn out of the old economy by the higher wage. Ho declines
and HN increases. However, there is a limit to how long this reallocation will continue. The
labor market equilibrium condition in (15) defines Ho as a decreasing function of the ratio
At
Bt
. In steady state, for a given number of entrepreneurial firms N, from equation (9) we
see that the ratio At
Bt
assumes the constant value Z. It follows that the allocation of skilled
workers to the old and new economy sectors (Ho, HN) will be stable in steady state.
Compensation of skilled workers in the innovation sector
Consider now the determination of the wage in the innovation sector. As is standard
in the search literature (see, for example, Pissarides, 1985), we assume that the wage ω
that innovating firms pay to skilled workers is an outcome of a Nash bargaining process
between the financial intermediary and the skilled worker. Suppose that β ∈ (0, 1) mea-
sures the bargaining power of workers and 1− β measures the bargaining power of financial
intermediaries.
Let St be the value of a financial intermediary without a skilled worker (i.e. in searching
state), let Jt be the value of a financial intermediary with a skilled worker, let Ut be the
value for a skilled worker of being in the unmatched state, and finally let Vt be the value
to the worker of being in a match. Let ωt be the wage of innovative skilled workers. In
addition, assume that if an innovation occurs the entire value (PDV of profits) goes to the
financial intermediary.12 Let κAt be the search cost incurred by a venture capital firm, which
increases with the amount of intermediates since the level of expertise required to find the
appropriate match rises with the level of productivity. This leads to the following arbitrage
equations:
ρ Jt = −ωt + η
(
δ At pit
ρ
− Jt
)
+ J˙t, (16)
ρ St = −κAt + f(θ) (Jt − St) + S˙t, (17)
ρ Vt = ωt + η (Ut − Vt) + V˙t, (18)
ρUt = wHt + f(θ)/θ (Vt − Ut) + U˙t. (19)
All these equations are simple arbitrage conditions equating the flow return from holding
an asset to the return from lending the asset’s value at the interest rate ρ. For example, the
flow return for an innovating firm is equal to the sum of the wage cost (−ωt), the expected
12This can be thought of as a risk-sharing arrangement, whereby the worker gets paid a wage during the experimentation
stage even when there is no tangible output to show for the work, but once the innovation is made, its entire profit stream gets
captured by the financial intermediary.
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gain (the perpetual stream of monopoly profits from a measure δ At of new blueprints), and
the appreciation in the value of the asset (J˙).
In order to obtain a closed form for the the wage we impose the balanced growth path
assumption (we discuss off-BGP dynamics in Appendix C). We drop time subscripts to
simplify notation. To find the wage, denote the total productivity-adjusted surplus13 from
a match by D˜ = J˜ − S˜ + V˜ − U˜ . The solution to the Nash bargaining process calls for the
following division of the surplus:
V˜ − U˜ = β D˜, (20)
J˜ = (1− β) D˜, (21)
where, by free entry, we impose S˜ = 0.
Using the arbitrage equations and the solutions to the bargaining process, we get the
following expression for the productivity-adjusted value of the wage ω˜ (see Appendix A for
details of the derivation):
ω˜ = β
(
η δ pi
ρ
+
κ
θ
)
+ (1− β)w˜
H
. (22)
This expression indicates that the wage in the innovation sector is a weighted average of w˜
H
,
the reservation wage of skilled workers (the wage they would earn in manufacturing), and(
η δ pi
ρ
+ κ
θ
)
which is the sum of the expected PDV of profits in productivity adjusted terms
and the average search cost per unmatched skilled worker.14 Three factors contribute to the
compensation earned by a skilled worker in the innovation sector: the forgone wage in manu-
facturing, the expected value of the successful innovations the skilled worker can potentially
come up with, and the saving of subsequent search costs for the financial intermediary once
a successful match occurs. The greater the bargaining power of workers (β close to 1), the
closer they get to extracting the full productivity-adjusted expected value of the measure
δA of successful innovations they come up with as well as for saving the firm the cost of
subsequent search. On the other hand, if skilled workers have low bargaining power (i.e. β
close to 0), then the wage ω˜ is close to the wage of skilled workers in the manufacturing
sector w˜
H
(in productivity-adjusted terms). In general, the costly search creates economic
rents associated with a successful match and skilled workers in the entrepreneurial sector are
able to bargain for a wage higher than their reservation wage
13The productivity-adjusted surplus is simply the value normalized by productivity. For example J˜ = J/A.
14 The expected PDV of profits associated with a measure δ A of ideas for new intermediate goods is ηδApi/ρ (where η is
the instantaneous flow probability of success). In productivity-adjusted terms, the expected PDV of profits is η δ pi
ρ
. As for
the average search cost, note that when the number of searching financial intermediaries is F, the total search cost incurred by
them is κF . If the number of unmatched skilled workers is H −N , the search cost per unmatched skilled worker is κF
H−N . In
Section 3.3, the ratio of unmatched skilled workers to searching financial intermediaries
(
H−N
F
)
was defined as θ. From this it
follows that F
H−N =
1
θ
and that the search cost per unmatched skilled worker (i.e. the average search cost) is κ
θ
.
For more on the interpretation of the solution to the Nash bargaining problem, see Pissarides (2000, p.17).
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w˜
H
< ω˜ <
η δ pi
ρ
,
i.e. there is wage inequality within the group of skilled workers.
How does the skilled wage in the innovation sector depend on N? First note that as
shown in Appendix A, when search costs are zero there are no economic rents associated
with a successful match. Workers in the innovation sector get paid the marginal product of
their labor (the expected value of innovation):
ω˜ =
η δ pi
ρ
.
Under this assumption, the wage will behave the same way as profit per product line pi,
which is an inverted U-shaped function of N . As N rises, so does the productivity gap Z
between the two manufacturing sectors, and this draws skilled labor out of the old economy
and into the new economy firms. The market size for innovation therefore increases, and so
does the profit per product line. Eventually, however, N is high enough that any further
increase in the number of innovating firms takes place at the expense of both old and new
economy firms: there is a net outflow of skilled labor from new economy manufacturing
firms, and this reduces the market size for innovation and profit per line.
In Appendix D we show that there exists a certain threshold number H∗ of skilled workers
in the old economy such that
dpi/dN > 0 only if H0 > H
∗ .
It follows that if the allocation of skilled labor across old and new economy firms is such
that H0 > H
∗, profit per line, and thus the wage of skilled workers in the innovation sector,
increase in response to an increase in the number of entrepreneurial firms.15 For the case of
non-zero search costs, the skilled wage in the innovation sector will increase for an additional
reason as financial markets improve – the rising average search cost – κ/θ.16 However, this
effect will be dominated by the profit effect as long as the search cost κ is low relative to
profits from innovation.
Wage Result 2: The productivity-adjusted wage of skilled workers in the innovating sector,
ω˜, is an inverted-U shaped function of N .
Unskilled wages
15 An interesting implication is that continued improvements of financial markets (or acceleration of technological progress)
may reduce profits.
16 This cost rises because H − N , the pool of skilled workers with projects but without funding, shrinks as the number of
matches increases. At the same time, the number of intermediaries (F ) increases. Together, these changes reduce the ratio
θ = (H −N)/F and therefore increase κ/θ.
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The productivity-adjusted wage of unskilled workers is given by
w˜
Lt
=
Bt
At
[
Hρ
Ot
+ Lρ
] 1−ρ
ρ Lρ−1, (23)
which is increasing in Ho and decreasing in A/B. Both of these variables depend on N –
more innovation and faster growth draws skilled labor out of the old manufacturing sector
and increases the productivity gap between the old and new manufacturing sectors. In
steady state, since both Ho and A/B are stable, the productivity-adjusted wage of unskilled
workers will be constant. However, it still holds that comparing across two steady states,
the productivity-adjusted wage of unskilled workers will be associated negatively with the
steady state number of entrepreneurial firms. It follows that
Wage Result 3: The productivity-adjusted wage of unskilled workers, w˜L, is strictly de-
creasing in N .
Note that the absolute level of the unskilled wage Bt
[
Hρ
Ot
+ Lρ
] 1−ρ
ρ Lρ−1 will fall as the
number of skilled workers in the old economy declines, but will grow with productivity B as
the old sector benefits from the spillover. It is therefore possible that the wage of unskilled
workers initially falls, but in steady state (once Ho stabilizes) it will rise at the rate at which
B increases. Thus the model does not rule out an absolute decline in real wages of unskilled
workers followed by a rebound (which is consistent with the pattern in the US data for wages
at the 20th percentile and below over the last 25 years – Yellen, 2006).
Skill premium
From (4) and (23), the skill premium in manufacturing is given by
w˜
Ht
w˜
Lt
=
(
Hot
L
)ρ−1
, (24)
which is diminishing in the ratio Hot
L
, and therefore increases as the ratio Hot
L
falls. In the
steady state, the skill premium in manufacturing is constant since Ho stabilizes.
In the comparative statics below we will show that as financial markets improve, the steady
state ratio Ho
L
declines. The intuition for this result is that as financial markets improve,
more entrepreneurial firms are formed and the growth rate of the new economy productivity
parameter, A, increases with the more rapid expansion of varieties of intermediate goods.
As the wage of skilled labor in the new economy rises (equation 14), skilled workers prefer
to move to those firms. Additionally, some of the skilled workers from the old economy
firms get matched with financiers and move into the innovation sector. Thus the number of
skilled workers in the old economy firms declines on account of the combination of exit to
the research sector and to the new economy firms.
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The skill premium calculated as the ratio of the average wage of skilled workers to the
wage of unskilled workers
N
H
ω˜ +
(
1− N
H
)
w˜
H
w˜
L
=
N
H
ω˜
w˜
L
+
(
1− N
H
)
w˜
H
w˜
L
also increases when financial markets improve and more entrepreneurial firms are formed.
Since we have that w˜
H
< ω˜, an increase in N – keeping wages constant – would lead to an
increase in the average skill premium simply by the composition effect. In addition, however,
we have that w˜
L
falls and – if N is not too high – ω˜ increases (wage result 2). Thus, as
long as N is not too high, the average skill premium increases unambiguously when more
entrepreneurial firms are formed. For higher values of N, ω˜ falls (wage result 2). If this fall
is enough to offset the fall in w˜
L
, as is likely to be the case for very high values of N , the
skill premium may fall.
Within-group inequality
Empirical studies of wage inequality in the US have argued that rising residual, or within-
group, inequality is a major component of the increased dispersion in overall wage inequality
(Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008). These studies have also documented that the rise in
residual inequality appears to be largely above the median of the residual wage distribution
(i.e. in the upper tail of the distribution, among mainly college educated workers). In our
model heterogeneity among skilled workers arises on account of the two different occupations
that are open to them (working in manufacturing or in the innovation sector).
Our model generates predictions on conditions under which within-group inequality (the
ratio of ω˜
w˜H
) will increase when financial markets improve. Improvements in financial markets
lead to a higher number of successful matches (i.e. N increases). Recall that the productivity-
adjusted wage of skilled workers in manufacturing w˜H is constant regardless of the number
of entrepreneurial firms (wage result 1). If the productivity-adjusted wage of skilled workers
in the innovation sector increases with N , within-group inequality (the ratio of ω˜
w˜H
) will
increase. Above we have established that when workers have some bargaining power, the
wage in the innovation sector will be higher than the wage of skilled workers in manufacturing
and will be an inverted U-shaped function of N . Thus, if the innovating sector is not too
large (N is not too high), within-group inequality will increase with N . Eventually, as most
skilled workers are employed in the innovating sector, within group inequality will decline.
Summary
The model predicts an increase in the skill premium in response to financial development
since skilled workers are drawn out of the old economy firms as the number of intermediate
goods expands more rapidly with the improved functioning of financial markets. Further-
more, as long as profits increase with N , the model predicts that the wages of skilled workers
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in the innovation sector also increase when their bargaining power is greater than zero.17 This
has two implications. First, within group inequality among skilled workers increases. Second,
the skill premium calculated on the basis of the wages of all skilled workers also increases.
3.5 Balanced Growth Path
Along the balanced growth path, N˙ = 0 ⇒ N = M/η. Furthermore, the asset values grow
at the same rate as productivity
J˙
J
=
V˙
V
=
U˙
U
=
A˙
A
= ηδN.
(henceforth we drop time subscripts since we are focusing on the BGP).
Our hypothesis is that improvements in financial markets (i.e. an increase in ζ) contribute
to entry of more entrepreneurial firms, faster growth, and widening wage inequality. In order
to demonstrate this, we first derive a two-equation system in (J,N) which will help us pin
down the equilibrium value of N .
The first equation of the system is derived from the free entry condition on the financial
intermediation sector. Free entry into financial intermediation implies S = 0 and, from (17),
it follows that
J =
κA
f(θ)
,
where κA is the instantaneous search cost incurred by a financial firm and f(θ) is the flow
probability that the firm will be matched with a skilled worker. Dividing by A to convert
the above value function into a productivity-adjusted value and substituting for f(θ) from
equation (11) we get
J˜ =
κ
ζ θ1−φ
(25)
where θ = (H −N)/F is the ratio of unmatched skilled workers to financial intermediaries.
Recall from equation (12) that the probability of a skilled worker matching with a financial
intermediary is M
H−N =
f(θ)
θ
= ζ θ
1−φ
θ
. Along the balanced growth path N˙ = 0, and therefore
M = ηN . Let ϑ(N) denote the probability of a skilled worker matching with a financial
intermediary along the balanced growth path. This probability is given by:
ϑ(N) ≡ η N
H −N = ζθ
−φ, (26)
17 As described above, as long as there are enough skilled workers in the old economy sector (H0 > H
∗), profits per line pi, and
thus the wage of skilled workers in the innovation sector, will increase in response to improvements in financial markets. Since
the share of corporate profits in GDP has been increasing in the US economy over the last several years (based on data from
the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis we calculate that the corporate profit share of GDP has climbed
from its historic average of roughly 6% in the late 1970s to close to 10% in recent years), in terms of our model, this suggests
that the US economy has been operating to the right of the threshold H∗. We note, however, that this is not conclusive since
total profits ηδpi may go up even if profit per line pi falls if, for example, the productivity of innovation activities, δ, increases.
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where ϑ′(N) > 0. From this expression we see that the ratio of unmatched skilled workers
to financial intermediaries along the balanced growth path follows as θ = ϑ(N)−1/φ ζ1/φ, and
therefore the probability that a financial firm will be matched with a skilled worker along
the balanced growth path is:
f(θ) = ζ θ1−φ = ζ
(
ϑ(N)−1/φ ζ1/φ
)1−φ
= ζ1/φϑ(N)−(1−φ)/φ.
Substituting for f(θ) in (25), the equilibrium condition becomes
J˜ =
κ
f(θ)
=
κ
ζ1/φϑ(N)−(1−φ)/φ
= κϑ(N)(1−φ)/φζ−1/φ (FE)
We refer to this relationship as the free entry condition (FE). It is upward sloping in the
(J,N) space (from equation 26, ϑ′(N) > 0). As the value of research firms increases, more
financial intermediaries enter in search of a match until the value of a searching firm is driven
back down to zero. Since the number of financial intermediaries increases, the number of
matches (M ) increases and so does the number of research firms in equilibrium (N =M/η).
The second relationship between J˜ and N along the balanced growth path is derived
from equation (16). Dividing through by A and using J˙ = ηδNJ we obtain the following
expression for J˜ :
J˜ =
η δ pi/ρ− ω˜
ρ+ η − η δ N (27)
As we show in Appendix B, combining condition (27) with the above expression for the
wage of researchers (equation 22) yields
J˜ =
(1− β)
(
η δ pi
ρ
− w˜
H
)
− β κ
θ
ρ+ η − η δ N (JJ)
The expression, which we denote JJ, indicates that the value of an entrepreneurial firm
increases in the bargaining power of financial intermediaries (1 − β), the present value of
future profits from an innovation, and the productivity of research effort, δ. The value is
also increasing in the term η δ N which captures the “standing on the shoulders” effect asso-
ciated with innovating later rather than sooner, when there is a larger number of preceding
innovations to benefit from. The value is decreasing in the discount rate ρ and the flow prob-
ability of innovation η (a higher η implies a higher flow probability of the entrepreneurial
firm dissolving). The value is also decreasing in the bargaining power β of skilled workers
and the average search cost κ
θ
. 18
18An alternative way of introducing financial development would be to alter the division of rents as represented by (β, 1−β).
However, a priori it is not clear whether an increase or a decrease in β would represent financial development. On the one hand,
if financial development is thought of as being associated with better governance, improved monitoring, etc. and therefore a
larger share of the rents captured by the financier, then this would be represented by a decline in β. On the other hand, if
financial development in more searching intermediaries, then skilled workers might be more inclined to wait for an appropriate
match and their bargaining power would increase. This would be represented by an increase in β. Since the interpretation with
changes in the division of rents is ambiguous, instead we represent financial development with an increase in the efficiency of
the matching process (i.e. an increase in ζ).
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For a plausible set of parameter values, the JJ-locus plots the productivity-adjusted
value of an entrepreneurial firm
(
J˜
)
as an inverted-U shaped function of the number of
entrepreneurial firms (N) in the relevant range of N . To see this, simplify by assuming that
β is zero (workers have no bargaining power). The numerator of expression (JJ) depends
on N only through profits per line, pi. As discussed before, initially – starting from a low
number of entrepreneurial firms – an increase in N is associated with a net inflow of skilled
workers into the new economy sector. As the pool of skilled workers who use intermediate
goods expands, the value of an additional intermediate good (i.e. of an innovation) increases.
This causes pi and thus J˜ to increase. Beyond a certain threshold size of the innovation sector
(number of entrepreneurial firms), a further expansion in the number of firms will be asso-
ciated with a net outflow of skilled workers from the new economy sector. The innovation
sector grows by drawing skilled workers out of both the old and new economy sectors. As
the pool of skilled workers who use intermediate goods in the new economy sector shrinks,
the value of an additional intermediate good and J˜ fall.19
Equations (FE) and (JJ) form a system in J andN which determines the BGP equilibrium
as depicted in Figure 2. In fact, there can be two steady state equilibria. As discussed in
Appendix C, the steady state to the left of SS1 is an unstable equilibrium. We therefore
focus on SS1. Note that the intersection can occur in either the upward or downward sloping
part of the JJ curve.
Figure 2: The determination of balanced growth path values of number of entrepreneurial firms, N, and
productivity-adjusted value of an entrepreneurial firm, J˜ .
19The effect of N in the denominator is to increase J further, but it’s not enough to offset the falling market size effect.
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Comparative Statics
The key comparative static experiment we want to focus on is a reduction in financing
frictions (i.e. an increase in the parameter ζ of the matching function from Equation 10),
illustrated in Figure 3 as a shift to the right in the FE curve. The probability of a successful
match increases with the improvement in financial markets, drawing a larger number of
skilled workers into the innovation sector. At every level of J˜ , there is a higher number of
entrepreneurial firms in equilibrium. The increase in the number of entrepreneurial firms
leads to a faster expansion in the variety of intermediate goods (
.
At
At
rises as shown in Figure
4). Since the steady state ratio of relative productivity At
Bt
increases, this drives up the wages
of skilled labor in the manufacturing sector. As N rises, HO – the employment of skilled
workers in the old sector – falls and the skill premium increases (Equation 24). As for the
absolute level of the unskilled wage, it may initially fall as the number of skilled workers in
the old economy (HO) declines. However, in the long run all wages grow at a faster steady
state rate due to the accelerated pace of innovation (which results from greater financial
sophistication and the employment of skilled workers in the innovation sector).
The steady state effect on wages of skilled workers in the innovation sector depends in
an important way on what happens to profits. If the equilibrium occurs in the upward
sloping part of the JJ curve (SSB), profits increase with the reduction in financing frictions.
When skilled workers have some bargaining power, with improvements in the functioning
of financial markets their wage will increase relative to the wage of skilled workers in man-
ufacturing. Within group inequality will therefore increase. Ultimately the model predicts
that the equilibrium must move to the downward sloping part (SSC), after which profits
will begin to decline. As profits fall, the wage of skilled workers in the innovation sector will
also eventually decline relative to the wage of skilled workers in manufacturing, and within
group inequality will decrease.20
Figure 5 shows a numerical simulation of the model. The six subfigures plot how the
steady state levels of several key model variables respond to greater financial development, i.e.
an increase in ζ. As discussed above, the size of the innovation sector increases (Figure 5(a))
and the skilled employment in old economy firms declines (Figure 5(b)). Skilled employment
in new economy firms increases initially but starts declining for higher values of ζ, reflecting
the initial net inflow of skilled workers into new economy firms and subsequently the net
outflow as more skilled workers get matched with financial intermediaries (Figure 5(c)).
Profits follow the same pattern (Figure 5(d)). The skill premium, as measured by the ratio
of manufacturing skilled wage relative to unskilled wage, increases uniformly (Figure 5(e)).
20Even if the balanced growth path level of (productivity-adjusted) skilled wages in the innovation sector falls, it will still
increase initially. To see this observe that it takes time for N to rise and so initially profits are unchanged. At the same time
the inflow of financiers into the market is immediate (F jumps) so that θ falls immediately. From equation (22) it follows that
the wage in the innovative sector jumps up.
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Figure 3: Improvement in matching efficiency of financial markets (increase in ζ) - comparative statics.
Figure 4: Financial development and changes in the steady state ratio Z = AtBt .
Within group inequality initially rises but eventually starts to decline (Figure 5(f)).21
21For the parameters used here, the decline in within group inequality sets in at a higher value of financial development
than the decline in profits does (compare Figures 5(d) and 5(f)), indicating that within group wage inequality can continue to
increase for a while even with falling profits. This is because, as mentioned above, the skilled wage in the innovating sector
rises also due to an increase in average search costs (κ/θ) brought about by a fall in the ratio θ = (H −N)/F .
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(a) Size of the innovation sector N .
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(f) Within group wage inequality ω/wH .
Figure 5: Numerical simulation of the model. The effect of financial innovation (increase in ζ) on the
balanced growth path values of the key variables.
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4 Data
The model presented above predicts that, ceteris paribus, a greater degree of financial market
development is associated with a higher skill premium. It is also possible that the within
group inequality among skilled workers increases. This section describes the state-level data
we use from the US to test these predictions.
Our financial development variable is a measure of financial deregulation based on Black
and Strahan (2001) who document the timing of legal changes in state-level regulations
concerning bank branching.22 We focus on the period 1977-2006. The coverage begins in
1977 since prior to this time it is difficult to identify state of residence in the data.23
Starting from 1970, a number of states deregulated their banking sector by permitting
out-of-state holding companies to consolidate their in-state subsidiaries into branches of
one bank company, as well as by allowing intrastate expansion of branches. Jayaratne and
Strahan (1996) demonstrate that these changes improved the quality of intermediation and
had a positive impact on state-level growth rates. Furthermore, they argue that the timing
of deregulation was not influenced by state-level economic indicators. We conjecture that
the changes in the banking industry improved the flow of finance to in-state businesses
and subsequently affected wage outcomes as outlined in the theory section. Black and
Strahan (2002) show that entrepreneurial activity (measured by the rate of new business
incorporations) increased following banking deregulation across the US in the 1980s, which
is consistent with one aspect of the theory outlined above - the entry of new entrepreneurial /
innovation firms in response to financial development. The results we present below provide
evidence that financial deregulation is also associated with changes in wage outcomes as
suggested by our hypothesis. In our baseline regressions in the next section, we use the
date when instrastate branching was permitted as the initial year of financial deregulation.
In separate regressions we also use the date when cross-border mergers and acquisitions of
banks were allowed (interstate deregulation) as the initial year of financial deregulation.
We use March Current Population Surveys (CPS) for worker characteristics and wages.
Our sample construction procedure follows Autor et al. (2008). We use a sample of white
male civilian workers between 25 and 54 years old. We exclude self-employed workers as well
those who report part-time employment or having worked less than 40 weeks. We also drop
the observations with allocation earnings. We multiply top-code earnings values by 1.5 and
exclude observations with hourly wage less than $2.8 (in 2000 dollars). All nominal variables
are deflated using the personal consumption expenditures deflator and we use CPS weights
in all our regressions.
In order to ensure comparability in educational attainment through 1991 with the data
22 Black and Strahan (2001) studied the impact of deregulation on the relative wages of men and women and women’s share
of managerial positions within the banking industry.
23Black and Strahan (2001) document dates of deregulation up to 1996. The one additional state that introduced intrastate
deregulation after 1996 was Iowa, in 1999 (Levine et al. 2007).
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from 1992 onward (when the coding of this variable changed in the CPS), we use the re-
coded educational attainment variable EDUCREC which classifies workers (including those
surveyed prior 1992) into nine categories based on the number of years of schooling reported.
The nine categories are zero or preschool; grades 1-4; grades 5-8; grade 9; grade 10, grade 11;
grade 12; 1-3 years of college; 4 + years of college. We classify workers into four categories
based on educational attainment reported under EDUCREC: less than high school (grades
1-4; grades 5-8; grade 9; grade 10, grade 11); high school diploma holder (grade 12); some
college (1-3 years of college); college and advanced degree holder (4+ years of college). In
some specifications we combine the first two groups together into an “unskilled” category
and the latter two groups into a “skilled” category.
We calculate potential experience from the age of the worker and the years of education.
We assign years of education based on Lange and Topel (2006), who attach the following
discrete values to the nine educational categories in EDUCREC: 0, 2.5, 6.5, 9, 10, 11, 12,
14, 16. The years of potential experience then follows as the age of the worker less years
of education minus six. For example, a worker who is 50 years old and has 12 years of
education is given 32 years of potential experience. We exclude workers with zero or less
potential experience. With regard to occupation, we pool the occupations reported in the
CPS into 10 categories according to the classification system ranging from professional to
labor-intensive occupations.
5 Empirical Evidence
This section presents results from two separate tests of our hypothesis. First, we test the re-
lationship between the skilled-unskilled wage gap (skill premium) and financial deregulation
by estimating individual-level Mincerian wage regressions with data from the March Current
Population Surveys (CPS). Second, we test the relationship between residual (within group)
inequality and deregulation. In all of the specifications we follow Black and Strahan (2001)
in dropping South Dakota and Delaware since the large presence of credit card companies
in these states makes them outliers.
In terms of testing the model presented above, our hypothesis is that state-level financial
development affects outcomes in the entrepreneurial sector and the labor market at the
level of the state. Two important caveats with connecting the theory to the empirics are
as follows. It is possible that entrepreneurial firms may be able to access finance from
out-of-state, which would confound our empirical analysis. However, since we emphasize
a broad range of innovative activities that includes adapting new technologies to the local
environment, implementing new business ideas that cater to the local clientele, as well as
support services such as bill processing and legal consulting, the entrepreneurial firms we
have in mind are small start-ups which are less likely to attract the attention of large, out-
of-state financiers. Furthermore, to the extent that high skill workers can migrate across
state boundaries, the empirical analysis may not detect an association between state-level
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financial development and labor market outcomes at the level of the state. In the presence
of migration, the estimates we present below are therefore lower bounds on the true effect.
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5.1 Skill Premium
We estimate the effect of deregulation on wages through individual level Mincerian wage
regressions.25 Here we can directly allow for differential effects of deregulation on individuals
with different educational attainments. Recall that our model predicts that the skilled-
unskilled wage gap will rise following deregulation. This happens because wages of skilled
workers (those with some college or more education) rise on average while the wages of
unskilled workers (those with high school diplomas and less than high school) fall.
The baseline specification employed is:
wist = αs + µt + γEist + δDst + θDstEist +Xistβ + ²ist (28)
where w is the logarithm of weekly real wage, αs and µt are the state and year effects,
respectively. Dst is the binary variable for banking deregulation that takes on the value 1 if
state s has deregulated its banking sector by time t, Eist is the categorical variable repre-
senting the education attainment of individual i resident in state s in year t. Xist represents
a vector of individual level controls: experience, experience squared, their interactions with
educational attainment, and occupation. To capture the secular rise in the skilled-unskilled
gap that is unrelated to deregulation we allow the time effects to be specific to each education
category.
The results are reported in Table 1. The omitted category for education attainment is less
than high school completed. The baseline results in Column 1 indicate that deregulation
had a negative impact on wages for workers with relatively low levels of education. The
interactions between deregulation and the education attainment categories (all significant at
the 1% level) show that the effect of deregulation turned positive only for those workers with
some college and higher levels of education (i.e. the skilled workers).
The point estimates show that the wages of college graduates went up by 1.2% while those
of workers with only high school diploma fell by 2.2%, which implies a 3.4% increase in the
skilled-unskilled wage gap. This is an economically significant change since it accounts for
24 For example, high skill workers can migrate from Maine to Massachusetts. If Massachusetts deregulates earlier and the
skill premium in the state rises according to the mechanism presented above, this may attract high skill workers from Maine.
The increased supply of high skill workers can then act to dampen the rise of the skill premium in Massachusetts, while the
scarcity of those workers in Maine serves to drive up the skill premium there. With perfect mobility, the skill premium would
be equalized and our empirical analysis would find no association between deregulation and changes in the skill premium.
25 Black and Strahan (2001) use a similar approach to study the impact of banking deregulation on wages and the share
of women in managerial employment within the banking industry. Their interest is in testing whether prior to deregulation
workers captured economic rents within the regulated banking industry and if banks practised discrimination against women
workers.
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∆ Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap +3.0% +3.1% +3.0% +2.9% +2.9%
High School 0.049* 0.034 0.031 0.027 0.028
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Some College 0.109*** 0.029 0.025 0.022 0.024
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021)
College 0.249*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021)
Deregulation -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.050*** -0.051*** .
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) .
Dereg. x HS 0.044*** 0.030** 0.029** 0.027** 0.024***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
Dereg. x SC 0.072*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008)
Dereg. x Coll. 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.056*** 0.053***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008)
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES NO
Year Fixed Effects (× Edu.) YES YES YES YES NO
State-specific Trend NO NO YES YES NO
State-specific Trend Sqr. NO NO NO YES NO
State-year Fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES
Occupation NO YES YES YES YES
R sq. 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
N 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329
Table 1: Skill Premium; Including education category-specific time effects to capture the
the faster rise of skilled wages. All regressions excluding South Dakota and Delaware;
Additional controls are experience, experience squared and their interactions with edu-
cation. Standard errors clustered at state-year level;* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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8% of the rise in the skilled-unskilled wage gap in our sample. These results are robust to
including occupation as an additional control (Column 2).
To allow for the possibility that states may experience different trends in wages over
this period which may also be correlated with the timing of deregulation, in Column 3 we
include a state-specific time trend and, in Column 4, we include its square as well. In both
specifications, the effect of deregulation continues to be positive for workers with college
education. Although the magnitude of the effect for college graduates is smaller (a 0.5 %
increase), the wages of high school graduates fall by 2.4%, again resulting in an almost 3%
rise in the wage gap. Finally, in Column 5, we include state-year fixed effects to control
for state-wide influences on the labor market that may vary over time, such as changes in
labor laws or taxation of businesses. With state-year fixed effects we cannot identify the
level effect of deregulation (as deregulation is constant within a state-year category), but
the interaction terms can still inform us about the relative effect of deregulation on wages of
different educational groups. The the estimates of the coefficients on interaction terms are
almost identical in magnitude and significance to the ones estimated in the preceding three
columns: again we find that banking deregulation has a positive effect on the skilled-unskilled
wage gap, increasing it by 2.9%.
An alternative way of timing the deregulation of the banking sector is to use the date when
cross-border mergers and acquisitions of banks were allowed (interstate deregulation) as the
initial year of financial deregulation. In Table 2, we use the same specification (Equation 28)
used in Table 1. The difference is that now Dst, the binary variable for banking deregulation,
takes on the value 1 if state s has permitted cross-border mergers and acquisitions in its
banking sector by time t. In all specifications, the point estimates are smaller but they
again show an increase in wages of college educated workers (between .3% and .8%) and
a fall in wages of workers with only high school education (between −2.3% and − 0.7%).
However, the effects of interstate deregulation are not statistically significant, suggesting
that intrastate changes are more closely associated with wage outcomes within the state.
We also estimate Equation 28 using the date of either intrastate or interstate deregulation
as the initial year of deregulation. We find evidence of a widening of the skill premium
(represented by the difference in log wages) associated with deregulation. The results are
similar to the ones reported in Table 1 (where we used intrastate regulatory changes to time
the onset of banking deregulation).26
We also run the specifications separately within education categories. The results from
the preceding tables indicated that the effect of deregulation was negative for workers with
high school diplomas and less than high school completed, but that it was positive for
workers with some college and higher levels of educational attainment. We therefore combine
workers with high school diplomas and less than high school completed into the category of
26We also estimate the wage regressions separately by region, splitting the sample into the four divisions of West, Midwest,
South, and Northeast. The results indicate the largest increase in skilled-unskilled wage gap in the West and an actual narrowing
of the gap in the Northeast. Results are available from the authors.
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∆ Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap +2.0% +2.2% +2.3% +2.3% +2.5%
High School 0.061** 0.042* 0.038* 0.034 0.034*
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Some College 0.128*** 0.044* 0.039 0.036 0.037*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021)
College 0.270*** 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.085***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021)
Deregulation -0.020 -0.021 -0.005 -0.011 .
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) .
Dereg. x HS -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013
(0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.013)
Dereg. x SC -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.015)
Dereg. x Coll. 0.017 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.012
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.015)
R sq. 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
N 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES NO
Year Fixed Effects (× Edu.) YES YES YES YES NO
State-specific Trend NO NO YES YES NO
State-specific Trend Sqr. NO NO NO YES NO
State-year Fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES
Occupation NO YES YES YES YES
Table 2: Skill Premium; Interstate Deregulation. Including education category-specific
time effects to capture the the faster rise of skilled wages. All regressions excluding
South Dakota and Delaware; Additional controls are experience, experience squared and
their interactions with education. Standard errors clustered at state-year level;* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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∆ Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap +3.3% +3.1% +2.9% +2.8% +2.8%
High School 0.050** 0.036 0.032 0.028 0.029
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020)
Some College 0.111*** 0.032 0.028 0.025 0.027
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021)
College 0.251*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.072***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.021)
Deregulation -0.066*** -0.057*** -0.052*** -0.048*** .
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) .
Dereg. x HS 0.034** 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.018**
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008)
Dereg. x SC 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.041** 0.039** 0.038***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
Dereg. x Coll. 0.067*** 0.051*** 0.050** 0.048** 0.046***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009)
R sq. 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
N 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329 427,329
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES NO
Year Fixed Effects (× Edu.) YES YES YES YES NO
State-specific Trend NO NO YES YES NO
State-specific Trend Sqr. NO NO NO YES NO
State-year Fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES
Occupation NO YES YES YES YES
Table 3: Skill Premium; Intra & Inter Deregulation. Including education category-specific
time effects to capture the the faster rise of skilled wages. All regressions excluding
South Dakota and Delaware; Additional controls are experience, experience squared and
their interactions with education. Standard errors clustered at state-year level;* p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
30
Intra Inter Intra & Inter
∆ Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap +0.3% +1.4% +0.5% +2.2% +0.3% +1.4%
Unskilled -0.014** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.014** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
R sq. 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
N 214,179 214,179 214,179 214,179 214,179 214,179
Skilled -0.011 -0.010 -0.020** -0.009 -0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
R sq. 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
N 213,150 213,150 213,150 213,150 213,150 213,150
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State-specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
State-specific Trend Sqr. NO YES NO YES NO YES
Table 4: Coefficients on deregulation in wage regressions for skilled (“college” and “some
college”) and unskilled (“high school” and “high school dropouts”) categories and the im-
plied change in the skilled-unskilled wage gap; Deregulation measures: columns 1-2 intra-
state, columns 3-4 inter-state, and columns 5-6 inter & intra. The dependent variable is
log weekly wage. All regressions excluding South Dakota and Delaware; Additional con-
trols are experience and experience squaregd. Standard errors clustered at state-year
level;* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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less skilled workers. The other category of skilled workers includes those with some college
as well as college and higher degree holders. All specifications control for experience and
experience squared. Table 4 reports the coefficient on banking deregulation from each of the
specifications. In the first two columns, we use intrastate deregulation. In Columns 3 and 4
we use the timing of interstate deregulation. In Columns 5 and 6 we use the date of either
intrastate or interstate deregulation as the initial year of deregulation. With each measure
of deregulation we also control for state-specific trends and their square.
Here we find that for all three measures of deregulation the skill premium increased
following deregulation, although the magnitudes are smaller. While the effect of deregulation
on wages is negative and significant within the group of less skilled workers, it is insignificant
(except for one of the six specifications) for the group of skilled workers. Although splitting
the sample in this way leads to a statistically insignificant effect of deregulation on skilled
wages, in combination with the findings on wages of unskilled workers the evidence suggests
a widening of the skill premium. These results are in line with the predictions of the theory:
banking deregulation is associated with an increase in the skilled-unskilled wage gap.
5.2 Participation
The results in Table 1 indicate that deregulation is associated with an increase in the wages
of workers with some college and higher educational attainments while it is associated with
a decrease in the wages of workers with high school diplomas and lower levels of educational
attainment. The theory outlined above indicates that an increase in the relative demand
for skilled workers lies behind these patterns. An alternative explanation is that changes
in labor supply drive the observed wage outcomes. One could imagine that even in the
absence of the mechanism described in our model, deregulation could affect the skill premium
if it affected the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor. Recall that in the old
economy firms the skill premium is inversely proportional to the H/L ratio (equation (24)).
In particular, if the labor force participation of less skilled workers increased relative to the
labor force participation of skilled workers over this period (for example if deregulation had
a bigger impact on less skilled workers than skilled workers in terms of drawing them into
the workforce), the increase in the relative supply of less skilled workers could drive down
their wages relative to the wages of skilled workers. In Table 5, we study the impact of
deregulation on labor force participation and the supply of different types of workers.
In our sample for these specifications, we now also include workers who report zero weeks
worked, workers who report part-time work, and those who have reported working for less
than 40 weeks (non full-year workers). We also include workers with low reported weekly
wages as they often are in the part-time, low hours category. The additional controls included
in the regressions reflect other determinants of labor supply decisions - marital status, the
number of children under the age of five, and the non-wage annual income. We combine the
high school diploma holders and the high school dropouts into the category of low skilled
32
Unskilled Skilled
LF Participation 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R sq. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 253,113 253,113 253,113 235,987 235,987 235,987
Hours 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
R sq. 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
N 253,113 253,113 253,113 235,987 235,987 235,987
Full-time/Part-time 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005* 0.003** 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R sq. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
N 248,044 248,044 248,044 233,408 233,408 233,408
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
State-specific Trend NO YES YES NO YES YES
State-specific Trend Sqr. NO NO YES NO NO YES
Table 5: Labor supply variables: full/part-time indicator, labor force participation and
log hours worked. The reported coefficients are on intrastate deregulation. Columns
1-3 unskilled workers, columns 4-6 skilled workers. Additional regressors are education
level (categorical), experience, experience squared (and their interactions with educ-
tion), marital status, number of children under 5 in the household and the interaction of
marital status and the number of children. All regressions excluding South Dakota and
Delaware; Additional controls are experience, experience squared and their interactions
with education. Standard errors clustered at state-year level;* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
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workers (Columns 1 -3). College and advanced degree holders are classified in the category
of high skilled workers (Columns 4-6).
We study three different outcomes - a binary variable which takes on the value 1 if
the worker was in the labor force in the preceding week; the number of hours worked in
the preceding week for the respondents who were employed in the preceding year; for the
respondents who were employed, a binary variable which takes on the value 1 if the worker
worked full time (defined as 35 hours per week or more). Columns 1-3 report the results
for the low skilled workers. For the two binary outcomes, we report results from a linear
probability specification. The first column reports the baseline specification with state fixed
effects and calendar year fixed effects included in the regression. The second column includes
state-specific trends, and the third column also includes the square of the state-specific trend.
This order is repeated for Columns 4 - 6.
As the results from the top panel indicate, in our sample there is no significant effect
of intrastate deregulation on labor force participation either for low skill workers or for
high skill workers in any of the specifications. This suggests that our results in Table 1
are not being driven by shifts in the composition of the labor force. In particular, we find
no evidence of an increase in labor force participation of low skill workers or a decrease in
labor force participation for high skill workers following deregulation, suggesting that shifts
in relative supply of skills could not be driving the increase in the skill premium associated
with deregulation.
In the middle panel of the table we examine the effect of deregulation on hours worked.
Here we find an increase in the hours worked for both low skill and high skill workers. The
coefficient for the low skill workers is always significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient
for the high skill workers is significant at the 1% level in two out of the three specifications.
However, since the increase is very similar for both categories, it appears that the relative
supply of skilled workers did not decrease following deregulation, making it unlikely that
supply changes are driving our findings on the movement of relative wages.
In the bottom panel of Table 5, we study the effect of deregulation on the choice of
full-time versus part-time work among the respondents who were employed in the preceding
year. We find an increase in the probability that both low and high skilled workers are
employed full-time following deregulation, although in the case of high skilled workers the
coefficient is statistically significant only in one specification. However, since the probability
of working full-time goes up for both categories of workers following deregulation (and this
effect is significant in the baseline regressions for both groups), we cannot infer that the
relative supply of high skill workers fell (and therefore their relative wage increased) as they
switched to part-time employment.
We conclude that changes in relative supply (i.e. quantities) are unlikely to be driving
the results on wages reported in the previous sub-section.
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5.3 Residual Inequality
Our second test of the model’s predictions examines the relationship between various mea-
sures of residual inequality and banking deregulation. We implement a two-stage empirical
approach that exploits the panel nature of state-level variables.
In the first stage we use March CPS data over the same sample and time period to
estimate the Mincerian wage regression using Equation (28). We then extract the residuals
from this regression and aggregate up to the state-year level to get three measures of residual
wage inequality: the log residual 90th percentile / 50th percentile ratio (a measure of upper
tail residual inequality), the log residual 90th percentile / 10th percentile ratio and the
standard deviation of residuals (both measures of overall residual inequality). We examine
the within-state time variation in these measures of inequality in the second stage regression.
The specification used is
σ̂st = +αs + µt + δDst +Xstβ + υst. (29)
The dependent variable σ̂st is respectively the log residual 90th percentile / 50th percentile
ratio, the log residual 90th percentile / 10th percentile ratio, and the log of the standard
deviation of residuals. The covariates include αs- a state fixed effect that captures time-
invariant state-specific attributes that affect the dependent variable, µt - a time dummy
that captures macroeconomic shocks affecting all states in year t as well as the country-wide
time-variation in residual inequality, Dst is the banking deregulation dummy variable, and
Xst is a vector of state-level controls that includes the growth rate of Gross State Product
and the state unemployment rate. Since our unit of observation is at the state-year level,
we are unable to control for state-year fixed effects, but we do control for state-specific time
trends and their squares in the specifications. Again, we drop Delaware and South Dakota
from the dataset, which leaves us with 49 states (including Washington, DC) over 30 years
for a total of 1470 state-year observations.
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The results are reported in Table 6; panel A reports the results without additional controls
and panel B adds Gross State Product growth and the state unemployment rate. In Columns
1-3 we include only state and year fixed effects, in Columns 4-6 we add a state-specific trend
and in Columns 7-9 we additionally include its square. Except for the specification without
trend we find that the effect is positive and significant for both upper tail residual inequality
and overall residual inequality. Also, consistent with our hypothesis, the magnitude of
the effect is largest in the case of the upper-tail residual inequality measured by the 90th
percentile / 50th percentile wage ratio. For example, in Column 7 we find that it rises by
4.5% following deregulation, which accounts for 14% of the increase in the average of this
measure between 1977 and 2006.
In the bottom panel of Table 6, we include the growth rate of Gross State Product and the
state unemployment rate as additional controls. The results are robust to the inclusion of
these state-level variables that proxy for the strength of the state labor market. We conclude
that the evidence is indicative of a positive association between deregulation and measures
of residual inequality. The point estimates suggest that the relationship is strongest in the
case of upper tail residual inequality, which is consistent with our hypothesis.
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In Table 7 we report results on residual inequality using alternative ways of timing the
initial year of deregulation. The specification used is Equation (29). In the top panel, Dst,
the binary variable for banking deregulation, takes on the value 1 if state s has permitted
cross-border mergers and acquisitions in its banking sector (interstate deregulation) by time
t. While the association between interstate deregulation and various measures of residual
inequality is not as strong as seen previously with instrastate deregulation, we still find some
evidence of a significant (at the 10% level) relationship between deregulation and upper
tail residual inequality (Column 5), as well as between deregulation and overall residual
inequality measured by the 90-10 percentile differential (Columns 7 and 8).
In the bottom panel, we use the date of either intrastate or interstate deregulation as the
initial year of deregulation. As the results indicate, the effects are similar to the ones we
find when we use intrastate deregulation. The use of these alternative ways of timing the
initial year of deregulation suggests that intrastate deregulation has a stronger association
with residual inequality in the manner predicted by our theory, whereas the association is
not as strong with interstate deregulation.27
We take the above results across several specifications as highly suggestive of a relationship
between financial development and residual wage inequality as predicted by our model. In our
model, the quality of the financial market has a single dimension expressed by the efficiency
of the matching process. An improvement in this quality is predicted to increase both the
return to skill as well as within group inequality (if wages of workers in the innovation
sector rise with the increase in N). In the empirical analysis we use banking deregulation
as an indicator of improvements in financial intermediation. In the data we see evidence of
banking deregulation associated with a rise in the skill premium, residual inequality, and
upper tail residual inequality. Since banking deregulation is just one aspect of financial
development, it may be the case that different types of financial innovation affect the two
aspects of wage dispersion (overall and residual) in different ways. We leave this for future
research to explore.
6 Conclusion
Although considerable research has been done on the causes of widening wage inequality
in the US in the last two decades, little attention has been paid to the role of financial
markets in this process. The last two decades have also been a time of increasing financial
deregulation and the emergence of specialized financial intermediaries that focus on high risk
27We also estimate the residual wage inequality regressions separately by region, splitting the sample into the four divisions
of West, Midwest, South, and Northeast. The effects within the Midwest and the West are similar to the ones reported here -
deregulation is associated with an increase in all three measures of residual inequality. For the Northeast and the South, the
coefficients are not significant, with the exception of regressions that use the 90-10 differential as the outcome. For the South,
we find that banking deregulation is associated with a statistically significant decline (at the 5% level) in the 90-10 differential.
This effect is not robust, however. Significance drops once we include state-specific trends and the square of state-specific
trends. Results are available from the authors.
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investment, typically in the form of small, innovative start-ups. In this paper, we argue for
an independent role played by financial markets in facilitating these changes.
Empirical tests of the hypothesis provide support for our claims regarding the relationship
between financial development and wage inequality. Using a measure of banking deregulation
across US states, we find that the effect of deregulation is economically meaningful. Con-
sistent with our hypothesis that financial market development benefits high skilled workers
relatively more than low skilled workers, we find that wages of workers with college and more
advanced degrees benefited from deregulation, whereas the effect of deregulation on wages
was negative for workers with lower levels of education (high school diploma holders). We
also find that deregulation leads to greater residual inequality (specifically, upper tail residual
inequality), which is consistent with our hypothesis that financial market development in-
creases within group inequality among skilled workers. The estimated effects of deregulation
are economically meaningful. We find that wages of college educated workers increased by
between 0.5 - 1.2 % following deregulation, while those of workers with a high school diploma
fell by about 2.2 %. Similarly, residual (or within-group) inequality increased. The 90-50
percentile ratio of residuals from a Mincerian wage regression and their standard deviation
increased by 4.5% and 1.8%, respectively, following deregulation.
These results suggest that financial development, so far not emphasized as a contributing
factor, may in fact have been quite important for the changes in the US wage distribution over
the last few decades. The overall impact of financial development on the wage distribution
is likely to be even larger than what we find because of other important developments in
financial markets in the US during this period besides state deregulation of banking (for
example, the gradual weakening of the Glass-Steagall Act starting from the mid-1980s).
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A Compensation of skilled workers in the innovation sector
As is standard in the search literature, we assume that the wage ω that innovating firms pay
to skilled workers is an outcome of a Nash bargaining process. Let β measure the bargaining
power of skilled workers and 1−β measure the bargaining power of financial intermediaries.
Along the balanced growth path the productivity-adjusted asset values for an entrepreneurial
firm, a searching financial intermediary, a matched skilled worker and an unmatched skilled
worker are, respectively,
ρ J˜ = −ω˜ + η
(
δ pi
ρ
− J˜
)
+ ηδNJ˜ (30)
ρ S˜ = −κ + f(θ)
(
J˜ − S˜
)
+ ηδNS˜ (31)
ρ V˜ = ω˜ + η
(
U˜ − V˜
)
+ ηδNV˜ (32)
ρ U˜ = w˜
H
+ f(θ)/θ
(
V˜ − U˜
)
+ ηδNU˜ (33)
To find the wage, denote the total productivity-adjusted surplus from a match by D˜ =
J˜ − S˜ + V˜ − U˜ . The solution to the Nash bargaining process calls for the following division
of the surplus:
V˜ − U˜ = β D˜, (34)
J˜ = (1− β) D˜, (35)
where, by free entry, we have S˜ = 0.
Adding equations (30) and (32) and rearranging we get
J˜ + V˜ − U˜ = η δ pi/ρ− (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N = D˜ (36)
Similarly, rearranging the productivity-adjusted equation (32) we can obtain
V˜ − U˜ = ω˜ − (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N (37)
Substitute (36) and (37) in (34) to get
ω˜ − (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N = β
(
η δ pi/ρ− (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N
)
which can be rearranged to get
ω˜ = β
η δ pi
ρ
+ (1− β)(ρ− η δ N) U˜ (38)
This expression for the wage paid to skilled workers in the innovation sector can be
simplified further. From (31) we have that J˜ = κ
f(θ)
(since S˜ = 0). Furthermore, from the
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Nash bargaining solution we have V˜ −U˜ = β
(
J˜ + V˜ − U˜
)
. In other words, V˜ −U˜ = β
1−β
κ
f(θ)
.
Substitute for V˜ − U˜ in (33) to get
(ρ− ηδN) U˜ = w˜
H
+
β
1− β
κ
θ
Substitute in (38) to get
ω˜ = β
(
η δ pi
ρ
+
κ
θ
)
+ (1− β)w˜
H
(39)
which is the expression for the wage paid to skilled workers in the innovation sector.
Notice that when search costs are zero (κ = 0), there are no economic rents associated
with a match. From (31) we have that J˜ = κ
f(θ)
(since S˜ = 0). Substitute in (30) and
rearrange to get
ηδ pi
ρ
− ω˜ − ρ+ η − η δ N
f(θ)
κ = 0
When κ = 0, this equation reduces to ηδ pi
ρ
− ω˜ = 0.28 In this competitive setting, skilled
workers employed in the innovation sector are paid their marginal product, the expected
value of innovation η δ pi
ρ
. Equation 39 indicates that in this case,(1− β) ω˜ = (1− β)w˜
H
and
therefore that ω˜ = w˜
H
= η δ pi
ρ
.
B The JJ Equation
Substitute for Z˜ − U˜ from (37) into (36) to get
J˜ +
ω˜ − (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N =
η δ pi/ρ− (ρ− ηδN)U˜
ρ+ η − η δ N ,
from where
J˜ =
η δ pi/ρ
ρ+ η − η δ N −
ω˜
ρ+ η − η δ N
Substitute for ω˜ from (39) and rearrange to get
J˜ =
η δ pi/ρ
ρ+ η − η δ N −
β
(
η δ pi
ρ
+ κ
θ
)
+ (1− β)w˜
H
ρ+ η − η δ N
J˜ =
(1− β)
(
η δ pi
ρ
− w˜
H
)
− β κ
θ
ρ+ η − η δ N .
which is the expression for the JJ locus (JJ). When search costs are zero, κ = 0 and
w˜
H
= η δ pi
ρ
. The expression above confirms that in this case, since there are no economic
rents associated with a successful match, the value of the entrepreneurial firm is zero.
28Formally, we also have that f(θ)→ 0 as κ→ 0. However, using L’Hospital’s rule one can show that the third term on the
left converges to 0.
42
C Steady State Stability
The equilibrium of our model can be analyzed as a dynamical system in three variables N ,
θ, and Z. To see this observe that using equations (11) - (13) we can obtain an equation for
the evolution of N :
N˙ =
(H −N) ζ
θφ
−N η (40)
From the definition of Z (≡ A
B
, the relative productivity of new and old manufacturing
sectors), we have Z˙/Z = A˙/A − B˙/B. Using (7) and (8) we obtain an equation for the
evolution of Z,
Z˙ = Z
(
N δ η − λ
(
Z
µ
) 1
γ
)
. (41)
Next, differentiate J˜ = κ/f(θ) (dropping tildes to avoid clutter) to obtain
J˙/J = −f ′(θ)/f(θ)θ˙,
and use equations (16) - (21) to derive an equation for the evolution of θ
θ˙
θ
=[(−1 + α) (α2) α1−α β ζ θ1−φ
+
(1− α) α−1+ 21−α
H −N − L(
−1 +
(
Z (1− α) (α2) α1−α
) ρ
1−ρ
) 1
ρ
 β δ ζ η θ1−φ
 /r
+N δ η κ− (r + η) κ− (1− β) ζ κ
θφ
]/(κ (1− φ))
This is a nonlinear system in three variables. We analyze it numerically by linearizing
it around the steady state. Our results (available upon request) show that for reasonable
parameter values the steady state analyzed above, SS1, is saddle-path stable while the other
steady state is unstable.
D Financial development and within-group inequality
This section outlines conditions under which profits, and therefore the wage of skilled workers
in the innovation sector, increase in response to an increase in the number of entrepreneurial
firms N . In particular, we show that there exists a threshold H∗O allocation of skilled workers
to the old economy firms such that
dpi/dN, dω˜/dN
{
> 0
= 0
< 0
when
when
when
H
O
> H∗
H
O
= H∗
H
O
< H∗
Recall from equation (6) that profits pi are proportional to HN , implying that dpi/dN =
dHN/dN . Furthermore, since
HN = H −HO −N,
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we have that
dpi/dN = dHN/dN = −dHO/dN − 1.
This expression will be positive if dHO/dN < −1.
To see the conditions under which dHO/dN < −1, recall that the skilled labor market
arbitrage condition (15) implicitly defines H0 as a function of N . From (15) we have[
Hρ
Ot
+ Lρ
] 1−ρ
ρ Hρ−1
Ot
= (1− α)
(
1
α2
) α
1−α At
Bt
. (42)
From (9) we also have that in the steady state, the ratio At
Bt
is given by
Z =
(
nδN
λ
)γ
.
Substitute for the steady state At
Bt
in (42) to get
[
Hρ
Ot
+ Lρ
] 1−ρ
ρ Hρ−1
Ot
= (1− α)
(
1
α2
) α
1−α
(
nδN
λ
)γ
. (43)
Differentiating both sides of the expression with respect to N , it follows that
dHO/dN = −
(1− α)α2α/(α−1) γηδ
λ
(ηδN
λ
)γ−1
(1− ρ)(HρO + Lρ)(1−ρ)/ρHρ−2O (1− 11+(L/HO)ρ )
.
In order for dpi/dN > 0, we need dHO/dN < −1. In other words, we need
(1− α)α2α/(α−1)γηδ
λ
(
ηδN
λ
)γ−1 > (1− ρ)(Hρ
O
+ Lρ)(1−ρ)/ρHρ−2
O
(1− 1
1 + (L/H
O
)ρ
)
The RHS is decreasing in HO, and it is infinite when HO = 0. The LHS is decreasing in
N, and it is therefore increasing in HO. It is zero when HO is zero. The two sides of the
expression are graphed as shown below in Figure (6).
To the right of H∗O, HN and profits increase with N . As N goes up, skilled workers are
reallocated away from old economy firms and the net inflow into the new economy firms is
positive (HN rises). In addition, if skilled workers have some bargaining power, as we have
argued previously, wage ω˜ will also increase. Since ω˜
H
is constant regardless of the number of
entrepreneurial firms (wage result 1 in the main text), as ω˜ increases within group inequality
(measured by the ratio ω˜
ω˜
H
) will also increase.
However, we know that as N increases, the number of skilled workers in the old economy
(HO) falls. Starting from an initial allocation to the right ofH∗, as financial markets improve
and N increases, if N becomes sufficiently big (so that HO becomes sufficiently small and
is to the left of the threshold H∗O), the economy eventually ends up in the region where HN
and profits decrease with N . As we have argued in the main text, data on profits / GDP for
the US suggest that for the period of analysis, in terms of our model the economy has been
operating to the right of H∗. The model therefore delivers the prediction that within-group
inequality increases in response to an improvement in financial markets.
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Figure 6: Threshold allocation of skilled workers to the old economy firms (when HO > H∗O, profits rise
with an increase in N).
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